Views on Computationalism: Clark Vs. Searle

Views on Computationalism: Clark vs. Searle

Computationalism: the view that computation, an abstract notion of materialism lacking semantics and real-world interaction, offers an explanatory basis for human comprehension. The main purpose of this paper is to discuss and compare different views regarding computationalism, and the arguments associated with these views. The two main arguments I feel are the strongest are proposed by Andy Clark, in "Mindware: Meat Machines", and John Searle in "Minds, Brains, and Programs."

Andy Clark strongly argues for the theory that computers have the potential for being intelligent beings in his work "Mindware: Meat Machines." The support Clark uses to defend his claims states the similar comparison of humans and machines using an array of symbols to perform functions. The main argument of his work can be interpreted as follows:

p1. The brain is constructed like a computer, since both contain parts which enable them to function.

p2. The brain, like a computer, uses symbols to make calculations and perform functions.

p3. The brain contains mindware similarly as a computer contains software.

c. Therefore, computers are capable of being intelligent beings.

I find, however, that Clark's conclusion is false, and that the following considerations provide a convincing argument for the premises leading to this conclusion, starting with premise one: "the brain is constructed like a computer, since both contain parts which enable them to function." This statement is plausible, yet questionable. Yes, the mind contains tissue, veins, and nerves etc. which enable it to function, the same way that a computer contains wires, chips, and gigabytes etc. which it needs to function. However, can it be possible to compare the two when humans devised these parts and the computer itself so that it can function? If both "machines", as Clark believes, were constructed by the same being this comparison might be more credible. Clark might argue that humans were made just as computers were made so therefore it could be appropriate to categorize them together. I feel that this response would fail because it is uncertain where exactly humans were made and how, unless one relies on faith, whereas computers are constructed by humans in warehouses or factories.

My second argument against Clark's claims applies to premise two: "the brain, like a computer, uses symbols to make calculations and perform functions." Before I state what I find is wrong with this claim, I should explain the example Clark uses to support this premise, which is from the work of Jerry Fodor:

Ð'...Fodor suggestsÐ'... that there are neural symbols that mean, e.g., "it is raining" and whose physical properties lead in context to the generation of other symbols that mean "let's go indoors." If that is how the brain works then the brain is indeed a computer in exactly the sense displayed earlier.

The idea that human thoughts and impulses equate only a combination of symbols is hard to comprehend. My argument is that the human mind does not just receive a thought as a statement that says, "It is raining." Observations, feelings, and senses contribute to what we realize. For example, when one observes it is raining, are there symbols sending messages to the mind which detect what is seen? Or when one feels the raindrops falling as they are outside, is the sensation of feeling wet and cold simply groups of symbols sent from the exterior (i.e. skin which is cold, wet) to the interior (the mind)? If so, our whole world would be made of symbols, dictating how we feel and how we think, and that claim is not possible.

In premise three, Clark's claim is "the brain contains mindware similarly as a computer contains software." which I will also argue. Clark defies mindware as "our thoughts, feelings, hopes, fears and beliefs." I find it hard to compare computer software to human desires and beliefs, simply because software is added to a computer as a necessity. For example to install a new program, software is needed for installation. Software does not come with the computer in the same instance that human thoughts, instincts, and feelings are with us at birth. Clark's response to this argument might be something like, software is needed, but aren't beliefs and desires needed in a person for them to get along in society; to define who they are? However this response fails, because although it is true that we need desires and beliefs to choose our path in life, it is also true that other aspects of "mindware"-fears and hopes- are gained through experience: a man being afraid of a dog traces back to his childhood where he was bitten by one, a woman can hope her sick