War on Cocaine

"The potential supply of drugs is virtually unlimited; trafficking routes and points of entry into the U.S. are multitudinous; and once destroyed laboratories, drug shipments, planes, money, chemicals, and other trafficking assets can be replaced easily." Robert L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee give their readers insight into cocaine trafficking, the effects of cocaine on the Andes, and what has been done to lower the amount of cocaine produced and exported. Together the authors paint a picture that the cocaine trade is here to stay and that it has not fundamentally changed since the 1980s. They are realists about the severe limitations on any element of U.S. and international strategy to control supplies of coca and cocaine in countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru. Clawson and Lee state, "Our suspicion is that the most effective counter narcotics program for the Andean nations will be ones that are designed by and implemented by governments concerned, rather than by the United States or International Aid Agencies." When the counter narcotics efforts were initially implemented they sometimes seemed successful, but the drug traffickers quickly learned how to beat the system. International counter narcotics efforts in the 1980s and 1990s have been unsuccessful in eliminating the drug cartels by extraditing, eradicating coca, or having a strong, counter trafficking effect on the supply of drugs in the Andean countries. These counter narcotics efforts are the best examples of the poor performance level of International cocaine control.

One of the counter narcotic efforts was to eliminate the drug cartels, which were revolutionizing the production and transport of multiton loads of cocaine to foreign markets. The Medellin cartel and the Cali cartel are often remembered as two of the more dominant drug trafficking organizations in the 1980s and 1990s. The Medellin Cartel is considered to be the more violent drug organization. Followed by the less violent organization, known as the Cali cartel, which took over the cocaine trade after the Medellin cartel fell apart. Pablo Escobar was the original pioneer of the Medellin Cartel. He also was the leader of it from the mid eighties all the way till his assassination by the Medellin Search Bloc in December of 1993. Pablo Escobar and other members of the Medellin cartel successfully accomplished their political objective, which was to defeat the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty and dominate the Colombian justice system.

The U.S. extradition treaty was important in that it allowed for Colombia to send traffickers to the United States for trial and sentencing. Colombia's justice system had a difficult time prosecuting traffickers because they constantly faced the violence and ruthless domination of the Medellin cartel, so they needed the U.S. extradition treaty to prosecute traffickers and cartel leaders. Clawson and Lee state, "Judges that were trying drug trafficking cases in Colombia were offered the proverbial choices-death if they convict, a bribe if they set aside the charges." Only a few of the thousands people in trouble with cocaine trafficking in Colombia were ever extradited to the U.S, making the U.S.-Colombian extradition treaty ineffective. Crushing the cartels became extremely difficult because the criminals were neither being sentenced in Colombia or sent to the U.S. to be convicted and sentenced. The extradition of Colombian citizens was banned in 1991, in Colombia's newly written constitution. The Cali cartel took over cocaine exports around 1990 and they never had to deal with extradition, which had failed in Colombia in the 1980's.

A second counter narcotic effort was by the United States and many drug-producing countries to reduce cultivation of coca, by eradicating the crop. Coca can be eradicated by being uprooted by hand or aerial spraying. Eradication has taken place in Andean countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru to reduce the amount of coca that can be produced. Clawson and Lee state, "The Clinton Administration drug control policy has stressed the importance of eradication." The U.S. has researched the effects of aerial spraying in Panama and the U.S. fully supports eradication in the Andean countries. The U.S. believes that eradication will result in a lower amount of coca being produced; therefore there will be less cocaine that will reach the U.S. The U.S. has offered cash aid and support to Andean countries so that they have an incentive to carry out the politically unpopular eradication program.

Eradication did not have many positive benefits on either the Andean countries or the U.S. and international countries that supported it. Clawson and Lee state, "In the Upper Huallaga Valley, under a U.S. supported and funded eradication program that operated from 1983 through early 1989, seventeen thousand hectares were eliminated. Meanwhile, coca cultivation in the area increased by seventy two thousand hectares." There are large amounts of land in the Andean countries that are adequate for growing coca, which makes it difficult for eradicators. For any amount of hectares that are eradicated, there is an explosion in new plantings that usually double or triple what was originally eradicated. The farmers strongly opposed eradication, so it drove farmers away from the government and brought them closer to the guerillas. The U.S. is supporting and funding a counter narcotics effort that is once again unsuccessful. The eradication of coca in Bolivia, Colombia, and Peru has had no distinct effect on traffickers or the availability of cocaine in the countries where it is exported too.

The third counter narcotic effort was counter trafficking programs that were imposed by the U.S. with cooperation and assistance from the Andean countries. These programs intended to encourage farmers to abandon coca, raise the cost of getting from coca leaf to cocaine, and