What Accounts for the Stability of the Tokugawa Regime?

What Accounts for the Stability of the Tokugawa Regime?

In the first half of the Seventeenth century, the regime perfected by Ieyasu Tokugawa and his successors was based on the accepted system of daimyф domains which Nobunaga and Hideyoshi had been developing prior to Ieyasu's rule. It was thus basically feudal in structure, but it represented a highly organised and stable stage of feudalism, unlike Europe ever experienced. The reasons for the stability of such a regime are quite numerous, and demonstrate the bakufu government's capability of maintaining a time of peace for the better part of two centuries. They maintained this peaceful era by the strict regulation of the other powers of Japan, and thus there own influence was an omnipresent force throughout the nation.

After the battle of Sekigahara in 1600, by which Ieyasu's total control of Japan was attained, in order to achieve quick stability, as stated, he made use of the thoroughly familiar Daimyф System. Upon achieving this rapid yet superficial form of stability, he endeavoured to make various improvements so as to solidify the permanence of his own power, and subsequently Tokugawa rule in general.

This first method which he adopted to secure his position was by the division of land post-Sekigahara. The shфgun reserved for themselves a huge realm consisting of a quarter of the agricultural land of the country, located largely around their Kanto headquarters in Edo and the old capital region around Kyoto, but also including all the major Japanese cities, ports and mines. The other three quarters of the land was divided between three types of daimyф. Firstly, there were the 'related' daimyф which consisted of various branches of the Tokugawa family, most notably the three large domains of Wakayama, Mito and Nagoya. Then there were the many fudai ('hereditary') daimyф, who had been Ieyasu's vassals pre 1600, with their rather small fiefs in central Japan. Finally there were the tozama, who, during the battle of Sekigahara, had either been Ieyasu's enemies or powerful allies and still posed a threat to his rule. These tozama held relatively large fiefs at the western and northern ends of the islands, far form the strategically important central part of the country. Thus the Tokugawa coalition of shфgun, 'related' daimyф, and 'hereditary' daimyф (both of which were loyal to the shфgun), held well over half the agricultural land and virtually all the central and most strategic regions, and so any potential threat to Tokugawa rule was minimised.

Ieyasu's decision to establish his new capital city at Edo was an important one. It meant that he cut himself loose from Kyoto and would rule Japan from the centre of his military power. However, he did not aim to found Edo as only an administrative and military capital, but also the economic and cultural centre of Japan.

Based in Edo, the bakufu not only supervised directly the cities and the quarter of the land that constituted the shфgun's realm, but also acted as a supervisory government for the whole nation. This consisted of various councils, most of whom were part of the shфgun, but the top two councils were made up of a few selected 'hereditary' daimyф. These councils served as chairmen, but only in monthly rotation so as not to acquire a foothold in a position of power. Needless to say the tozama were excluded from the running of the bakufu. They were not necessarily loyal and held both much sway and land in the far off territories, and thus were a threat to stability.

Because of the fact that it is solely a hereditary position, the Tokugawa Shфgun proved in the end to be an ineffectual leader, and so it was a position that sank once again to that of a symbolic role. However, the bakufu was an efficient enough bureaucracy to function without shфgunal leadership. This is because, even though it depended on one's hereditary rank, there were always many more eligible men at each level than posts available, and so it was possible to choose the more able ones for actual service. Furthermore, this bred a certain amount of competition which encouraged people to try harder in order to attain a position in the government and thus led to a higher level of competence. Also, there were occasions that a man of outstanding ability was raised in rank and income by the Shфgun so to qualify them for the higher posts.

But it was not only the way in which the government was run that furthered Tokugawa stability. The daimyф's domains too were run in a manner which could not jeopardise the status of the Tokugawa regime.

Shortly after the battle at Sekigahara (1601), Ieyasu made all the feudatories sign a written oath of loyalty, by which they swore to obey all orders from Edo, and not to give protection or shelter to the enemies of the shфgunate. In theory the daimyф were autonomous, with their own laws, but such laws were shaped to conform closely with those of Edo.

In reality they were kept under strict control and surveillance and were often treated as little more than local officials to the shфgun. An example of the control exerted upon the daimyф is that during the first half-century of Tokugawa rule there were 281 cases of daimyф being moved from one domain to another (so as to weaken their hold of the loyalty of the peasants), and 213 cases of the confiscation of a domain because of the lack of an heir (thus preventing anyone vying for the rule of the domain and disturbing the state of peace) or for alleged misrule.

Although this interference was much more infrequent in later years, the shфgunate still monitored the domains closely, insisted on its right to approve of all daimyф inheritances and marriages, restricted castle construction and the size of military forces, prohibited direct relations between the various domains, and called on the daimyф for heavy contributions for the construction of its own castles and other public works. This was done to keep the daimyф's financial situations stretched and to hinder the development of any type of power or influence which would lead to being detrimental to the Tokugawa regime.

However, the most effective method of controlling daimyф, deterring their insurgence and keeping them financially stretched was the sankin kotai, or the system of 'alternate attendance'. Perfected in the 1630s this system decreed that a daimyф spent alternate years in residence at the shфgunal court and in his own domain. Also, during the year in which he resided in his own domain, a daimyф's wife and heir were to be left in Edo as