Why 9/11 Happened

The attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 were the direct result of the failure of US agencies, ranging from the White House to airport security, to recognize vulnerabilities present in the various symptoms. The reason why these vulnerabilities were not acknowledged and repaired is that these various agencies were trapped in a cognitive dissonance cycle of thinking. After the Cold War, terrorism was seen as a regional problem (9/11 Commission, 92). The majority of terrorist groups were either groups sponsored by governments or militants trying to create governments (i.e. Palestine Liberation Organization). As a result, the tactics used for fighting terrorism were centralized mostly in the Middle East and were restricted to task forces and field training by the US. The US ground forces were almost never used and, when used, were limited to small task force type missions. Furthermore, a majority of terrorist incidents prior to 9/11 usually ended in negotiations (9/11 Commission, 94). Because the government felt that it had a strong understanding of how terrorist situations occurred in the post cold war period, warning signs on the eve on 9/11 were ignored. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had a similar point of view in regards to security. The system they had in place by 9/11 was seemingly successful, for they had avoided hostage situations for 14 years. Furthermore, airlines were under increasing pressure to lower the cost of flights and make checking in and out of airports more efficient, which naturally led to security problems (Easterbrook, 164). The FAA and major airlines felt that there was no reason to fix a functioning system, and was powerless to make changes anyway due to economic pressures.

An uncomfortable state of tension is caused when contradictions occur within the cognitive system. People are therefore motivated to reduce or eliminate this tension state, which is known as cognitive dissonance (Larson, 29). For example, a man who eats 3 hamburgers per day might one day find out that eating food high in fat increases the likelihood of heart disease. Because he likes them, the man believes that eating hamburgers is good (if something is pleasurable, why wouldn't it be good?). Now he is told to believe that eating hamburgers is bad. Thus arises cognitive dissonance. People have a set of beliefs that is organized and logical. When information is introduced that contradicts those beliefs people have a tendency to react in several ways to reduce the inconstancy with which they have been presented. 1) A person could change his behavior (Larson, 30): the man mentioned above could stop eating hamburgers. 2) A change in environment could occur (Larson, 30): the man could start eating fat free hamburgers. 3) More consistent beliefs (some might call them rationalizations) could be added to the a person's cognitive system (Larson, 30); the man can tell himself that he is on the Atkins' diet and eating the hamburgers will allow him to lose weight and therefore be more healthy (not the correct conclusion to draw from the information, but one which fits the man's logic).

The effects of dissonance can change the way in which a person gathers information. A person could develop a selective attention span where he only pays attention to material that reinforces his accepted cognitive system. Interpretation of all material could also be skewed to fit that person's set of beliefs, creating a selective interpretation system (Larson, 31). When these methods are applied to the subject of foreign policy, the negative effects are obvious. For example, leaders could hold on to a belief system that is no longer valid. In the 1980s, the US viewed the USSR military power as threatening even though they were powerless. (Larson, 32) As a result, the government wasted millions of dollars on the Star Wars ballistic missile defense program that could have been spent on other programs. Another example of a negative effect is that in reacting to dissonance, leaders could also miss key opportunities that would have placed their country at an advantage (Larson 32). For example, because the US refused to believe that Stalin was holding to the agreements at Yalta (Larson, 151), Truman missed a key opportunity to befriend the great power and continue with Roosevelt's Grand Design. In the case of September 11, cognitive dissonance resulted in intelligence failure. There were several warnings within the US intelligence system, but the government ignored them because the new information did not fit the old paradigm of terrorism, and because the government discredited the warnings, the greatest tragedy on US soil ever occurred.

Before September 11, the Federal Aviation Administration perceived that sabotage was a much greater threat than hijacking. This is because there had been no domestic hijackings in a decade, the commercial aviation system was thought to be more vulnerable to explosives than to weapons, and explosives were perceived as deadlier than hijacking and therefore of greater concern (9/11 Commission, 82). The FAA therefore did not think that a hijacking was even a possibility. There was enough concern of sabotage that a "layered defense system" was implemented where a passenger went through prescreening, check point screening, and onboard security (9/11 Commission, 83). However, these were not effective, as the terrorists on 9/11 were still able to carry out their plan.

The blame of the hijackers getting on the planes lies solely on the airport security regulations of the FAA. Prior to 9/11, bags were rarely opened for a thorough inspection and inspectors watching the X-ray machines were not required to stop at each item and examine it individually (Easterbrook, 168). The cursory security was easily bypassed, as it is believed that the September 11 terrorists got their knives through the X-ray machine simply by lying them on their edges between two books, so that to the inspector the blades appeared as nothing more than a dark line (Easterbrook, 168). Airline security is even more culpable because, prior to 9/11, there had been numerous warnings that improvements were necessary. For example, the report of the presidential commission on airline security, chaired by Vice President Al Gore, strongly recommended that the federal government begin certifying the contractors who run airport screening stations (Easterbrook, 169). Furthermore, "Red team" inspectors, who staged tests of airport security, found it alarmingly easy to smuggle weapons onto planes or enter the tarmac areas without identification (Easterbrook, 164).

Due to the cognitive dissonance of the people in charge of security at airports, they were unable to stop the 9/11 attackers. When warned that their security was not strong enough, FAA officials gained information that was contradictory