First Person Perspective

a) The theme/topic of the journal article. Does it raise a significant philosophical issue/ take a definite position on the issue?

The first-person perspective is a very interesting topic which raised a significant philosophical issue. The first-person perspective same meaning as first-person point of view. Philosophers think that the existence of first person perspective is necessary to be called conscious. On the other hand, the words ‘I exist’ would have mystified the classical philosopher of antiquity. In contrast, no major of philosopher of antiquity will express anything by saying the words ‘I exist’. Usually, we always talk about the first person perspective is a viewpoint from our conscious mind ‘look out’ on our experience whereas intuitive will misguided.

Besides, the role of the first-person is conducting activity such that thought experiment designed to test metaphysical and conceptual claims about the mind. The experiment will show about the nature of mind and the nature of mental concept. It can be done either from the ‘third person point of view’ or the ‘the first person point of view’. The first-person view of the mental phenomena can seem to resist any explanation from the third-person point of view. The phenomena include some famous philosophical bugbears. For instances, perceptual experiences, qualia, consciousness, concurrent thought and even mental content. In addition, a concept of the first person perspective leads to an infinite regress. According to Chalmers, has stated that our direct knowledge of subjective experiences stems from our first-person access to them.

Thus, it can be understand the first person perspective could define without invoking a perspective. For instance, why people can understand why people have it and rocks don’t. As a result, the first-person perspective apparently gives on a freer rein.

b) Does it present arguments in support of the position it takes? Identify them

Perhaps the most important duality in the philosophy of mind is that between the first-person and third-person perspective of mental events. However, we are concern with the role of first person perspective in the distinctively philosophical activity. The first-person perspective means simply imagining it ‘from the inside’ which is access to herself/himself and the world to her/his experiences, emotions, thoughts, and actions. It also means imagining oneself doing or undergoing something.

A study by Schraube (2014) found that, psychological processes are always given subjectively in the first-person perspective. Human experiencing, feeling, thinking and acting with and in the world, are always socio-materially mediated processes through language, social and the technological world in someone’s processes. Besides of the existence of a subjective form, it also has an objective form. For instance, the emotion of fear is subjective in the sense that it only exists because it is experienced by an ‘I’.

There is a leading advocate, John Searle who argues for the first-person perspective, emphasized ‘conscious states have a first-person mode of existence’. States of consciousness, he points out, represent ontologically subjective givens because they exist exclusively when they are being experienced by a subject. Moreover, Saul Kripke has presented several arguments against various versions of the psychophysical identity theory (Shoemaker, 1997), he claimed that “for any given brain state that is a candidate for being identical with pain, one can imagine both being in pain without one’s brain being in that state”. Therefore, we assume that the successful of this argument would bring on the possibility of being in pain without any brain state stimulation in which would not have any brain state be seen as the ideal candidate in this point.

Besides, he also stated that “one can imagine not being in pain when one’s brain is in that given brain state”(Shoemaker,1997). Kripke's argument appeals to the concept of a "rigid designator". A rigid designator is defined as an expression that always refers to the same object in any possible state of affairs (“A rigid designator”, 2011). Thus, if pains were identical with C-fiber stimulations, then the statement, "Pain = C-fiber stimulation" would have to be necessarily true, if it were to be true at all. But, it is clearly not necessarily true. For even if there is a strict correlation between pains and C-fiber stimulations, all the same, it is easy to imagine that a pain might exist without a C-fiber stimulation existing, and a C-fiber stimulation might exist without a corresponding pain (Josh, 2009). But, if that is so, then the identity statement is not necessarily true, and if it is not necessarily true, it cannot be true at all. Therefore, it is false. Hence, “the necessity of identity and the rigidity of the concept of pain to argue from this that pain cannot be identical with that brain state”(Shoemaker,1997). In other words, it is possible for there to be pain unaccompanied by that brain state. And what goes for the identification of pains with neurobiological events goes for any identification of conscious mental states with physical events.

C. Evaluate the argument.

The main idea of this article was discussed about the bearing of first-person and third-person imaginings on physicalist view of mind which in the particular of identity theory and functionalism. There is of course that the main focus of the articles was first person perspective. In order to support this point, several philosophers had their claims that which contribute the reasons to believe this article.

Kripke’s arguments and his claims as well as examples were applied as the main support to the claim that proposed in the article. As what Kripke claimed on the basis of psychophysical identity theory, he claims that brain cannot be identical with any brain state in which inferred from imaginability and possibility. Although other philosophers, most notably Hilary Putnam were challenging the psychophysical identity theory, his arguments involved claims of nomological possibility which in support of the view that pain is a functional state that is “multiply realizable”. On top of that, their arguments was grounded