Hegel Love

Hegel's broken manuscript on Love is a great transition to one of his more popular works, The Spirit of Christianity, because he begins speculating the idea of love, and what it means to achieve that love. He attempts to answer many philosophical or otherwise unanswerable questions such as what it means to achieve "true union" and what it takes to maintain that bond. Since this manuscript was probably written "a year or eighteen months before The Spirit of Christianity" (pg. 302), many of these ideas were carried over into his new work in hopes of further speculating the conception of love and connecting them to Christianity. One of these ideas he introduces is the concept of dead objects and their relation to true union. Further, he ties it into an important term known as shame, and it is this shame that continually negates true union. In retrospect, the abundance of dead objects surrounding individuals force them into a constant struggle for true unity; thus, these individuals are striving to combat shame, but this very combat for shame contradicts Hegel's overall definition of true unity. Hegel's manuscript, however missing the pages seem to be, is left with no concrete conclusion on the conception of love.

Hegel incorporates a basic but fundamental term known as a "dead object" and a translator defines the dead object as such:

"[Here there is no living union between the individual and his world; the object, severed from the subject, is dead; and the only love possible is a sort of relationship between the living subject and the dead objects by which he is surrounded]" (pg. 303).

This statement clearly defines the term "dead object", but fails to show which objects can be considered dead. The rest of the paragraph continues to use this term concisely, but it is in the later paragraphs where the flaws in the definition become apparent. For now, the rest of the paragraph continues to explain the relation between man and object, and Hegel concludes through reasoning that "each [subject and object, man and matter] is only relatively necessary; the one exists only for the otherÐ'..." (pg. 304). If this is the case, fate would play a role in the purpose of an individual. If a man never finds "love", according to Hegel, he also never finds a reason to exist because there is no object for the individual (the subject). As a cause, the man finds love in non-necessities such as material possessions and property to cover up this void, and attaches meaning to both the man(subject) and the object: "He exists only as something opposed [to the object], and one of a pair of opposites is reciprocally condition and conditioned" (pg. 304). Best described in the side notes, "instead of opposing himself to an object outside him, he must realize that subject and object are neither of them absolutes but are reciprocally conditioned and thus elements in a living whole" (pg. 304). This analogy explains how both parts of the relationship must be conditioned for the pair to each have a purpose of existence. In addition, since this quote has a direct relation with attaching meaning to both subject and object, the analogy, elements in a living whole, has a direct parallel "in the sense that the one loves and the other is loved, i.e., that each separate lover is one organ in a living whole" (pg. 308). The term, "dead object", in turn is also targeted between living beings, where in terms of one of the two individuals, the other can act as the object. This is where the flaws in the definition become apparent; where the translations are open to interpretation.

The main link Hegel is trying to define is the connection between two living beings. Although there is also a relation between man and dead object, it is the lovers that are in a constant struggle to find true union, and only become distracted by the man vs. dead object relation. Moreover, "the lovers are in connection with much that is dead; external objects belong to each of them" (pg.308). Thus, the lovers are constantly challenged of their love. External objects continually obstruct the union between the lovers, and it comes to a point on whether or not the lovers are, in fact, in love with each other. In a sense, the one lover in terms of the other can also be "dead". Perhaps Hegel's short description of love may help: "True union, or love proper, exists only between living beings who are alike in power and thus in one another's eyes living beings from every point of view; in no respect is either dead for the other" (pg. 304). A careful inspection of the quote reveals that no one individual can play the role of dead object, or else true union cannot exist. This may only happen between material possessions or property, but in the case of two living beings, there should be absolutely no oppositions.

Hegel shows in the manuscript that dead objects are the sole obstructions to true union between two living beings. Before proving that this is such the case, another term must be defined to better understand Hegel's point of view: shame. According to Hegel, shame is defined as:

"Ð'...the raging of love against [exclusive] individualityÐ'... and enters only through the recollection of the body, through the presence of an [exclusive] personality or the sensing of an [exclusive] individuality" (pg. 306).

An even more detailed analysis of the term shows that shame is only brought upon those that try to avoid it. For example, Hegel gives an example of tyrants, money-chasing women, and vain women. All three do not possess shame, nor will possess shame in the future, because "they ascribe an intrinsic worth to it and are shameless" (pg.308). This shows that shame is only brought upon those that try to strive for true union. In turn, lovers try to "avoid" shame to achieve true union; a hasty conclusion shows that it is the only way for them to have pure hearts and to complete their union. The fault in that is the very act of avoiding shame is shameful itself. Individuals are constantly redefining their love to accommodate the inclusion of dead objects and the thoughts of "sensing of an [exclusive] individuality" (pg.306), but true union, according to Hegel, is nowhere near that. Additional statements from Hegel confirm such a speculation:

"This genuine love excludes all oppositions. It is not the understandingÐ'... It is not reason either, because reason sharply opposes its determining power to what is determined. Love neither restricts nor is restricted; it is not finite at all" (pg. 304).

The very thought of having an opposition, such as possession and property, puts a man at shame, and even if that