Moral Philosophy

One of the maxims or principles Sidgwick considers is that reason should never give way to Appetite or passion. In turn, he shows that they do not meet the four criteria. Sidgwick uses examples where reasonable people would have differing opinions about these maxims. He also puts into question whether they are clear and precise. I will draw attention to Sidgwick's argument pertaining to the third principle, that reason should never give way to Appetite or passion and his conclusion that it does not pass the scientific test.

On page 344-345, Sidgwick clearly states his disavowal of the third maxim mentioned above (now referred to as the third maxim). He writes "But if these rules are further understood (as they sometimes are understood) to prescribe cultivation of a habit of acting rationally; that is of referring each act to definitely conceived principles and ends, instead of allowing it to be determined by instinctive impulses; then I cannot see that the affirmation of this as a universal and absolute rule of duty is self-evidently true."

To support his argument, Sidgwick uses an example commonly witnessed where a reasonable person may agree that instinct may be a better spring of action then reason. On page 345, he writes "Certainly common sense is inclined to hold that in many matters instinct is a better spring of action than reason: thus it is commonly said that a healthy appetite is a better guide to diet than a doctor's prescriptionÐ'..."

Taken lightly, one may agree this holds true. However, with further inspection, I would argue that the reasonable individual would not agree. For it does not seem reasonable that in many matters instinct is a better spring of action then reason. Even if we act out of instinct, and it turns out for the best, it would still be better to reason before we act in order to judge what the best course of action is. Contrary to what Sidgwick considers common sense would say about appetite, it appears that common sense would be better guided by reason even to sustain himself and grow. Even given a healthy appetite, it does not mean that one will eat healthy foods. As a matter of fact, instinct can be tailored to want things that are not necessarily good for us. Means such as publicity and certain ingredients in foods may influence instinct in a negative manner and influence one to seek to eat unhealthy foods. These unhealthy foods may also contain ingredients which will influence instinct to be drawn to these unhealthy foods. Therefore it would appear one ought to seek out what a good diet is rather than simply eat whatever comes about because one has the appetite. An extreme case could be made such that one could imagine a doctor giving a list of foods which would cause fatal allergic reactions to an individual. This would be a result of ignorance and not of reasonable considerations. It seems that any reasonable person would agree it is clear and self-evident one ought to avoid these harmful foods instead of pleasing one's instinctual healthy appetite.

Certainly rational people would agree we ought to avoid harmful foods and reason offers the way of doing this. However, any rational person may argue that generally speaking, as Sidgwick would say, there is a certain excellence from services springing from spontaneous affection. Such as when one visits a loved one at a hospital, it seems one ought to do this out of spontaneous affection, and not necessarily through reasoned behaviour. I will discuss a few important points and examples regarding this argument and discuss that one ought to refer their decisions to reason even when acting out of genuine affection or feelings.

Spontaneous affection is hardly ever the result of something without any antecedents. Clearly, when one feels any physical or emotional impact, it is the result of a need or learned behaviour. It would seem more logical in most cases to consider spontaneous affection as a result of processes fashioned by previous experiences. When one chooses to act based on an apparently arbitrary motive like spontaneity, the underlying truth is commonly a result of habits instilled by a reasoned approach. However, it is clear that in a crime of passion, one is not necessarily acting as a result of a reasoned motive. There seems to be an absence of reason in this situation, which makes it clearer reason seems to offer a more effective means of defining what one ought to do.

I must acknowledge that Sidgwick needs only one case where it would seem one ought to act out of spontaneous affection to dismiss the third maxim. But it seems Sidgwick has yet to present such a case in his Method of Ethics. An example where spontaneous affection, at first glance,