Question: Why Did the Tsarist Regime Fall in 1917 Despite of the Reforms Introduced from 1906?

�The desire seems to have been to reform and improve existing institutions rather then to destroy them root and branch.’ Though this quote is in reference to the French Revolution of 1789, yet upon hindsight many historians envisage the striking parallels between the revolutionary movements of France in 1789 and that of the Russian Revolution in 1905, and hence historiography for the two revolutions can largely be cross contextual. Thus, although the concessions introduced from 1906 might be enough to suppress the relatively mild spirit of reform, it is not sufficient to stem the revolutionary challenge that arose during 1917. The main argument of this discursive is the question of reform versus revolution: two inherently different situations cannot be solved with only one solution. Another reason why the Tsarist regime fell was because the reforms that were introduced did not dissipate the discontent of the general masses: by not solving the grievances of the people effectively, this only means that resentment will grow with time and lead to higher expectations, which culminated in the climatic movement of 1917. Thirdly, the autocratic regime fell as the Tsar’s bastion of support had dissolved: this not only includes the landed gentry, but also the military forces that represented the element of coercion that a monocracy needs. With his support base gone, the Tsar himself has become but an iconic past. Lastly, the incidence of World War One creates a coincidence of discontent: not only has it precipitated the problems of the past, it has also become a problem of itself. Alan Wood questions, �Did the military situation generate the domestic crisis which brought about the disintegration of the Tsarist regime; or were the pressures and contradictions within the social and political system already of such a refractory nature as to make revolution in any case inevitable?’ The answer is that there is probably an essence of both, but very evidently the War exposes the weaknesses of the regime and discredited its existence, which led to a question of whether a political paradigm shift is required.

�Historians disagree on whether the revolution was inevitable by mid 1914.’ Taking the question to a deeper level, we will query the inevitability of the revolution: whether one subscribes to the Optimist view or the Pessimist view. In the former, which is identified with by most of historians, they believe that nothing is inevitable and the direction of history may be deviated or steered in any single direction with any single event, hence in our example the February Revolution of 1917 is by no means unavoidable. Soviet historians, however, share the latter view where the revolution is historically logical and inevitable, and by 1917 the stage is set for an imminent revolution. Thus, we shall examine why the Tsarist regime fell in 1917, and then determine to what extent is the downfall of the regime inevitable.

The Tsarist regime fell in 1917 because the challenge posed by the revolutionaries was far greater and more united then any other front in Russian history. In 1905, many in Russia were not aiming for a complete overthrow of Tsarism as their intention was to force concessions such as land reform and higher wages, which were basic liberal demands that did not call for a revolutionary change as with 1917. When these concessions were made, the struggle by the masses ceased, as seen by the drastic drop in lawlessness after the cancellation of the redemption payments, from 13995 strikes in 1905 to 6114 in 1906. By introducing the reforms, the Tsar had effectively stemmed the tide of the revolution. However by 1917 �the situation is growing worse. The capital is in a state of anarchy. The government is paralyzed…General discontent was on the increase.’ The upsurge of the politically radicalized masses is now united by their common discontent that arose out of the incidence of World War One coupled with the poor administration of Tsarism, something which did not happen before in 1905 and that the reforms from 1906 did not effectively tackle. With the ineptness of these reforms and to a certain extent even aggravating the discontent of the Russia masses, this will bring out the next point, which is the failure of the reforms introduced from 1906.

Although �The October Manifesto took the wind out of their sails’ by appeasing the masses and dividing the revolutionaries, thus reducing the political threat that the Tsar had to face, yet we see in 1906 what appears to be this major step in Russia’s progressive westernization was actually only temporarily. The Fundamental Laws introduced in April 1906 reinstated the superlative control of the Tsar, such as Article 4, where �The All-Russian Emperor possesses the supreme autocratic power.’ Furthermore Article 87, which gives the Tsar and his ministers to bypass the Duma if it is not in session, effectively taking the greatest concession that the October Manifesto gives out of the picture. �The net effect of all these changes was to deliver much less than the Manifesto had promised.’ and although the simple existence of the Dumas was important in itself, yet the fact remains that it only acts as a cloak of legality. The Vyborg Manifesto that was introduced in June 1906 resulted in the withdrawal of many liberals as many Kadets and left wing deputies went to Finland but were arrested, hence the Kadets were deprived of their leaders and the beginning of gradual liberal change was curtailed by the Manifesto. Lastly, the agrarian reforms introduced by the Prime Minister Peter Stolypin sought reorganization but not concession: which proved to be insufficient in its bid to save Tsarism. Although the peasants held greater control of the land (from 31% in 1877 to 47% to 1917) and the authority of the Mir was reduced, yet many peasants wished to keep the Mir system, which was seen as a form of security. Moreover, strip farming still persisted and poverty and tensions remained: the fact that troops were used 114000 times to put down disturbances in the countryside showed the degree of discontent that existed within the peasantry with regards to Stolypin’s reforms. Considering that the intention to reform was extant, yet the premises of the Stolypin legislation were false and ultimately aggravated the situation in Russia. As seen, the reforms that were introduced from 1906 not only did nothing to solve Russia’s problems or dissipate the discontent of the masses, but its inactiveness only led to culminating tensions in the expectant state of the people.

Upon hindsight, we see throughout history that there are two essential aspects to an autocracy: support and repression. As