Shed Light on the Management of Complex Projects

In this paper, we draw on studies of failure and safety in complex systems in

order to shed some critical light on the management of complex projects. It is

accepted that complex technology systems inevitably give rise to errors (social

and technical), which can lead to failures (Perrow, 1984). We suggest, by drawing

on a wide range of literature on failure in complex systems, that failures in projects

can similarly be understood in terms of complexity. Such literature suggests

that failures occur as a consequence of the multiple interactions (linear and nonlinear),

internal contradictions, and geographically dispersed and "multi-nodal"

(i.e., multiple sites of control and influence) nature of projects. However, it is also

noted that such systems can be improved through ongoing targeted interventions

"on the ground" (i.e., high-reliability organizations). After examining the occurrence

of these interventions in complex projects, we question the veracity of tight

centralized management control in projects and argue, instead, for a mix of centralized

management, through the development of a coherent project vision, and

"interventions" of the type found to be useful for improving safety in complex systems.

We conclude from this that project management, as a body of knowledge,

needs to distance itself a little from the "rationalist" "command and control" discourse

to which it presently subscribes (Thomas & Buckle, 2004a, 2004b) in order

to take on, or at least make possible, some of the messier work of "intervention."

We see the management of the majority of projects as essentially residing between

these two positions.

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