The Central Asian Game

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the geopolitical scene in the center of the Eurasian continent has altered fundamentally. The independence of five Soviet Central Asian republics, and the enduring weakness of these states created a political vacuum that external powers have ever since competed to fill. Soon after this ground-breaking development, a paradigm evolved defining Russia, Turkey and Iran as major players in the entire Ð''southern tier' of the former Soviet Union, that is the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia was correctly identified as a retreating hegemonic power, whereas Turkey and Iran were seen as competitors for influence in especially the six Muslim states that gained independence, that is the Central Asian states and Azerbaijan. This paradigm, which accorded little importance to other international or regional actors, has to a large extent survived in media as well as academia. [1] However, almost ten years after the Soviet collapse, viewing Central Asia through the prism of a Turkish-Iranian-Russian triangle offers at best highly limited guidance to understanding the security and geopolitics of that region.

In the analysis of international security, the state has generally been center of analysis, with focus on the defense of territory. The result of this thinking has been an understanding that the state is the ultimate arbiter in international relations, where each state is governed by power politics, seeking to maximize its security, if necessary at the expense of other states. In many cases, this has led to an assumption that the security of one state results in the insecurity for another, and similarly it is presumed that state actors interact with each other on the basis of interests and gains. State power is generally understood as shaped by the extent of territorial control and possession of natural resources. The possession of such assetsÐ'--be it presently, or formerly as in the case of European states with a colonial pastÐ'--play a significant role in defining the national power, threat perceptions and security needs of individual state. During the Cold War, this thinking remained. In this context, the creation of five independent Central Asian states in 1991 resembled the independence from west European empires of former overseas colonies. In the case of Central Asia, the role played by Russia had been of a similar nature as other European colonial powers, playing the role of the ultimate arbiter leaving little or no space for outside interlocutors until the collapse of the Union. But accounting for the remaining Russian factor, through the 1990s the security of Central Asia has increasingly come to be linked with the areas to its southeast rather than to its southwest. Afghanistan, Pakistan and China in particular are countries that form an increasingly crucial part of Central Asian security. Conversely, the emergence of independent and unstable nations in Central Asia has considerably influenced the geopolitics of South Asia and China. Cross-border ethnic and religious links between these states are significant; moreover, ancient economic links and trade routes are being revived, increasing interaction between the regional states. But most importantly, the question of Afghanistan is a major security issue that impacts all regional states and links their security to one another. In sum, strong linkages between South Asian/Chinese and Central Asian security are emerging, the character of which is likely to have significant impact on international politics in both an Asian and a global context.

Cold War Relations

In the aftermath of the second world war, the emerging bipolar structure of world politics resulted in what can be termed an Ð''overlay' of cold war politics over regional matters in most parts of the world. It was increasingly believed that the interplay between state actors and protagonists was leading to a situation where controversies at the global political level was overlapping the regional parameters of regional complexes. [2]

The concept of regional security complexes bases itself on the existence of regional groupings of states whose security are intrinsically linked to each other. Accordingly, security studies traditionally take place at the level of individual states or at the level of global politics. This approach limits the analysis, as the security of a given state is by necessity more dependent on what goes on in certain states rather than others: most often, states in the immediate neighborhood of the state in question. However, regional security complexes may at times be absorbed by politics at a higher level: this is called overlay. In Buzan's words, overlay occurs when Ð''one or more external powers move directly into the local complex with the effect of suppressing the indigenous security dynamic'. [3] This principle could be easily seen in play during the post-war and cold war settings. Afghanistan by the 1950s was drawn into the Soviet sphere of influence. Pakistan along with Iran and Turkey since the late 1940s had come to play a crucial role in American efforts to contain the Soviet Union, through its membership in the Baghdad pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).

Another development of the 1950s was the deterioration of previously amicable Sino-Soviet relations to the freezing point. During this time when Afghanistan and Russia had growing and ever developing relations, Iran, Turkey and China came to play lesser roles in the Central Asian sphere. None of these states enjoyed either direct or indirect relations with the republics of Central Asia during the cold war. This meant the interruption of ancient trade routes, the most famous of which being the Ð''Silk Road'. In fact, Central Asia's main access to the sea was historically through present-day Pakistan, but after its incorporation in the USSR and the final delimitation of Central Asia's internal borders in 1936, the region became economically linked to the Soviet planned economy, governed from Moscow. Cold war politics in this manner locked into place the security of the USSR's southern border for a considerable amount of time. Afghanistan was increasingly falling into the Soviet orbit and in conflict with Pakistan; Pakistan and Iran were on the other hand crucial US allies. But this situation changed in the I970s. The 1979 Iranian revolution deprived Washington of a crucial ally, weakening its position in Asia and the Middle East, although the new Iranian regime's relations with Moscow remained cool. Meanwhile Afghanistan slipped into instability by the mid-1970s, precipitating a Soviet military intervention in 1979 and an ensuing war in which Washington and Islamabad actively supported the anti-Soviet Mujahideen forces. In effect,